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CODIB-D-111/1.7/6
13 June 1967

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMMITTEE ON DOCUMENTATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Report of CODIB Task Team VII - Analyst
Communication

REFERENCES:
a. USIB-D-39.7/6, 6 May 1964
b. CODIB-D-111/1.7/5, 7 April 1967 (Attached)

A. Background

This is a report on the study undertaken by CODIB's Task Team
VII, Analyst Communication, pursuant to USIB direction contained in
Reference a. The task team was chaired by a representative of the
Department of State with additional members from DIA and CIA. The
objectives of the task team were to: (a) study present practices
and procedures in the field of intelligence analyst-to-analyst
communications to ascertain whether improvement is required; and,
if required, to develop proposals to facilitate the exchange between
analysts of substantive information and personal judgment and
expertise, and (b) to determine the feasibility of establishing a
centralized intelligence community directory service as an aid in
any program of improvement. The study was confined to those com-
ponents of USIB agencies in the Washington, D. C., area which pro-
duce current, basic or estimative finished intelligence. For
practical reasons the team concentrated its study on one geographic
area (viz., Latin America); however, the problems were discussed with
a number of analysts in other geographic and functional areas. The
team felt that the coverage was sufficiently broad to validate the
views set forth in its report.

B. Summary of Task Team Findings

The task team found that while the situation with respect to
analyst-to-analyst communication was generally more satisfactory than
had been presumed when the team was organized, there is much room for
improvement. Analysts in one agency communicate with analysts in

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another agency for two major purposes: (a) to exchange views and
judgments and (b) to obtain information. Such communication is not
generally undertaken to avoid duplication of effort. Although
present facilities and procedures enable an analyst in one agency to
identify and make contact with analysts in another agency, there are
many inadequacies, and the cumulative effect of these is a definite
impediment to useful analyst-to-analyst communication. The only
communication system fully accessible to all analysts is the black,
insecure telephone. While it should not be used for classified
discussions or to transmit classified information, the task team
reported that it is widely and extensively used to discuss classified
matters. For the most part the needs of analysts would be satisfied
by a system that would enable communication at levels no higher than
SECRET.

The NSA secure telephone (gray phone) system is available only
to analysts with special clearance, which many in DIA and State do
not have. The instruments are located only in restricted areas, in
many cases remote from a large number of analysts who do have the
proper clearance. Furthermore, the gray phone system should be used
only to discuss SIGINT materials. Expansion of this system would
be both expensive and difficult and is not planned at present.
Teletype and LDX (Long Distance Xerography) are available to a limited
extent but use of these mechanisms is time-consuming and cumbersome,
and the analysts must leave their desks and files in order to use
them. Just at the time a particular analyst needs to communicate
with another the equipment may be engaged in priority communications.
Furthermore, DIA is not yet in the LDX network.

The "green" phone system, in use now and being expanded for
secure voice communication between key offices in the Washington area
(i.e., White House, State, DoD and CIA), offers considerable
promise for alleviating the present deficiency in facilities for
analyst-to-analyst secure communication. There are now about 100
KY-3 terminals in CIA, 30 in State and about 200 in or planned for
DoD. Others are planned for CIA and State. None is in DIA at
present although some are planned. Seven additional secure telephone
outlets can be obtained for each KY-3 terminal at a cost of about
$1800 per terminal. The lines can be extended up to 1,000 feet
from the terminal provided they are given adequate security pro-
tection. These additional green phones, if located in the analysts
working areas, would greatly improve the present analyst-to-analyst
communication capabilities. The task team recommends that this be
done wherever feasible.

The task team found no enthusiasm by analysts for a centralized
directory service and concluded that it could not be justified
because of the security problems involved, the cost and the difficulty

of establishing and maintaining such a service. In lieu thereof,
the team felt that increased access to listings of key personnel,
organizational charts, and telephone directories of the various
agencies would aid significantly in identifying and locating the
appropriate analyst in another agency.

The task team believes that the use of closed circuit television
techniques could be developed into a useful means of analyst-to-
analyst communication especially between photo interpreters and general
analysts. The feasibility of these techniques has been demonstrated.
However, application to real-life situations requires further research,
which the task team recommends be undertaken. In particular, the
means for insuring security of the video signal between buildings or
agencies must be developed.

The task team reports that there may be unprecedented progress
in the field of secure communications in the next few years. Therefore,
it believes that continuous liaison is necessary between managers of
major analysis activities and those responsible for planning and
developing secure voice systems in order to take full advantage of
new developments in terms of improved analyst-to-analyst communication
capabilities.

C. CODIB Comment

We believe that there is much to be gained by improving, through
concerted community effort, the mechanisms by which analysts in one
agency or building can make contact with analysts in another agency
or building and discuss classified matters. The temptation is very
great to use the insecure telephone, which is on virtually every
analyst's desk, for discussion of classified matters, especially when
the only alternative is a time-consuming personal visit to discuss
a matter that would require only a short telephone conversation. We
believe that the secure voice and other communications media available
to analysts are far from satisfactory. We agree with the task team
that the "green" phone system offers good prospects for immediate
improvement.

We also agree with the task team, but not necessarily for the
same reasons, that a directory service to assist in identifying and
contacting analysts is not warranted at this time. We feel that we
should not place any greater temptation before the analysts than they
now have to use the insecure phone system for classified conversations.
We view with some alarm the statement by the task team that the
insecure phone system is used widely and extensively to discuss
classified matters. Steps should be taken immediately to remedy the
condition which makes this practice a virtual necessity. We believe

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that the problem of a directory service should be examined again after
there has been an improvement in the facilities for secure voice
communication between analysts in different buildings. In the
meantime, the exiting liaison staffs should be permitted to secure
and have available such telephone directories, organizational charts,
listings of key personnel and handbooks from the other agencies as
are needed to assist those analysts whom they serve in identifying
and locating the appropriate analysts and sources of information in
the other agencies. In this regard we note that CIA no longer main-
tains a liaison officer at Arlington Hall where the bulk of DIA
analysts are located.

We believe that there is considerable advantage to be gained
from application of closed circuit television techniques to the
analysis and communication of intelligence. However, we cannot
foresee all of the gains with sufficient clarity at this time to
warrant recommending priority research and development.

D. Recommendations

We recommend that USIB:

1. Request its member agencies participating in the green secure
voice communications system to examine the locations of existing and
planned KY-3 terminals and, wherever warranted and feasible, add a
call box and extend the additional telephone lines thus provided
into appropriate areas so as to improve analyst-to-analyst communica-
tions capabilities between buildings and agencies, and that they
give this matter priority attention so as to alleviate as soon as
possible the current situation in which the commercial telephone
system is the only one available to a large percentage of the analysts.

2. Request the member agencies to assure continuing partici-
pation by managers of the major analysis organizations in the
planning activities of those people concerned with the development
and installation of secure voice communications equipment and systems
so that analyst-to-analyst communication capabilities may be improved
in the future to the maximum feasible extent.

3. Request the Central Intelligence Agency to serve as executive
agent for the intelligence community in developing closed circuit
television techniques, such as those already initiated by its Imagery
Analysis Division, with particular attention to solving the security
problems involved in using these techniques between buildings; and
request the other agencies to cooperate with the CIA in providing
technical information or consultation where feasible.

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4. Endorse the principle that the liaison staffs of the
various agencies should be permitted to obtain and have available
such telephone directories, organizational charts, listings of key
personnel and handbooks as are needed to assist those analysts whom
they serve in identifying appropriate analysts and sources of
information in the other agencies.

5. Note the attached report of CODIB Task Team VII.

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Chairman

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